Water Law Review
Volume 10

Issue 1

Article 34

9-1-2006

Vaughn v. People ex rel. Simpson, 135 P.3d 721 (Colo. 2006)
Michelle Young

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Michelle Young, Court Report, Vaughn v. People ex rel. Simpson, 135 P.3d 721 (Colo. 2006), 10 U. Denv.
Water L. Rev. 187 (2006).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

Vaughn v. People ex reL Simpson, 135 P.3d 721 (Colo. 2006) (holding
that an owner of ground water rights who authorized pumping of his
well in violation of a valid order of the diversion engineer was a "person who diverts ground water" pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-503,
and that the State presented sufficient evidence to support imposing
liability on the owner).
Michael Vaughn ("Vaughn") appealed ajudgment of the Colorado
District Court Water Division No. 1 ("water court"), which assessed a
monetary penalty against him for diverting water in violation of a valid
order of the division engineer. The two primary issues before the
Colorado Supreme Court were: (1) whether the statute at issue could
be interpreted to impose liability only on the individual who personally
turned on the well pump; and (2) whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support the water court's finding that Vaughn diverted or authorized diversion of ground water in violation of the engineer's order.
Pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-503, the state and division engineers filed a complaint against Vaughn alleging violations of the division engineer's order to discontinue diverting water from a permitted
well that Vaughn owned. At trial, the State presented direct evidence
of the following: the division engineer posted the order according to
statutory requirements; Vaughn received notification in the mail; and,
following the order to discontinue, a person (or persons) pumped over
six million gallons of water from Vaughn's well. However, the State
only presented circumstantial evidence regarding the particular persons who operated the well and how those persons ultimately used the
water. In his defense, Vaughn argued that the statute imposed liability
only on the person who actually operated the well in violation of the
order, and the State therefore failed to present sufficient evidence that
either he or someone acting as his agent actually operated the pump.
The Colorado Supreme Court began with an analysis of the statutory construction and legislative intent of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-92-503 to
determine whether an owner or user of water rights could be found
vicariously liable for the conduct of others within the meaning of the
statute. Subsection (6) (a) of the statute provided that "[a] ny person
who diverts ground water contrary to a valid order of the state engineer
or division engineer... shall forfeit and pay a sum not to exceed five
hundred dollars for each day such violation continues." The court
found that "person" and "divert" acquired particular significance beyond their common use through their definition in the Water Right
Determination and Administration Act of 1969. Unless indicated otherwise, "person" referred to an individual or a public or private legal
entity, including partnerships, corporations, municipalities, the state,
or even nations. The statute defined "divert" as the relocation of water
by means of a structure or device. Taken together in the context of a
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larger regulatory scheme and the legislative intent to prevent persons
from using wells in violation of discontinuance orders, the court found
that § 37-92-503 demanded an interpretation that included liability for
the acts of others. The court did not examine the outer limits of this
rule regarding liability for others' acts; rather, the court restricted its
holding to a ruling that the statute imposed liability on an owner to
whom the division engineer issued a discontinuance order and whose
well continued to be used with his authorization.
The court concluded with a brief analysis of the State's evidence at
trial including the volume of water removed from the well, the success
of Vaughn's alfalfa crop the year in which the water use was discontinued, and the improbability that an intruder would remove over six million gallons of water from Vaughn's well without him having noticed.
Based on this evidence and Vaughn's admission that he delegated the
farming and irrigation of the crop to his father and his children, the
court found that the water court correctly concluded that Vaughn was
a person who diverted water within the meaning of the statute. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the water court.
Michelle Young
In re Water Rights of Elk Dance Colorado, LLC, 139 P.3d 660 (Colo.
2006) (holding that the doctrine of issue preclusion bars a homeowners' association from re-litigating the ownership of disputed water
rights previously litigated in district court; and prevents the homeowners association from collaterally attacking the district court's subject
matter jurisdiction because it did not raise a jurisdictional challenge
either at trial or on direct appeal).
Members of a homeowners' association ("HOA") appealed Colorado Water Court, District Number 5, orders dismissing their petitions
to set aside decrees granting Elk Dance Colorado ("Elk Dance") authority to amend certain features of a previously decreed water augmentation plan. The water court held that a previous Summit County
District Court decision, determining Elk Dance owned the disputed
water rights, collaterally estopped the HOA from asserting ownership.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the water court's decision,
holding that the Colorado doctrine of issue preclusion barred the
HOA from claiming it owned the disputed water rights and prevented
a collateral attack on the district court's subject matter jurisdiction.
The water law issues and the parties in this case derived from a series of transactions commencing in 1980, when a real estate development group ("Development Company") acquired 6000 acres of land in
Summit County and obtained a decree for a water augmentation plan
providing for 175 acre feet of water per year ("Original Decree").
Shortly thereafter, the initial group of residential lot owners formed a
homeowners association ("HOA"). In 1989, the Development Com-

